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Criminal Adjudication, Error
Correction, and Hindsight Blind Spots
Lisa Kern Griffin*
Abstract
Concerns about hindsight in the law typically arise with
regard to the bias that outcome knowledge can produce. But a
more difficult problem than the clear view that hindsight appears
to provide is the blind spot that it actually has. Because of the
conventional wisdom about error review, there is a missed
opportunity to ensure meaningful scrutiny. Beyond the
confirmation biases that make convictions seem inevitable lies the
question whether courts can see what they are meant to assess
when they do look closely for error. Standards that require a
retrospective showing of materiality, prejudice, or harm turn on
what a judge imagines would have happened at trial under
different circumstances. The interactive nature of the fact-finding
process, however, means that the effect of error can rarely be
assessed with confidence. Moreover, changing paradigms in
criminal procedure scholarship make accuracy and error
correction newly paramount. The empirical evidence of known
innocents found guilty in the criminal justice system is mounting,
and many of those wrongful convictions endured because errors
were reviewed under hindsight standards. New insights about the
cognitive psychology of decision-making, taken together with this
heightened awareness of error, suggest that it is time to reevaluate
some thresholds for reversal. The problem of hindsight blindness
is particularly evident in the rules concerning the discovery of
exculpatory evidence, the adequacy of defense counsel, and the
harmfulness of erroneous rulings at trial. The standards applied
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. My thanks to
Brandon Garrett for especially valuable feedback on an earlier draft, to
participants in the Criminal Justice Roundtable at Duke University School of
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in each of those contexts share a common flaw: a barrier between
the mechanism for evaluation and the source of error. This essay
concludes that reviewing courts should consider the trial that
actually occurred rather than what “might have been” in a
different proceeding and proposes some new vocabulary for
weighing error.
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I. Introduction
Constitutional requirements and standards of review that
turn on hindsight warrant reconsideration in light of both recent
social science on decision-making and empirical advances about
error in the criminal justice process. For example, hindsight
pervades the operation of the Brady rule governing prosecutors’
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due process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, 1 the
Strickland standard for assessing the adequacy of defense
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 2 and the question whether
certain constitutional and evidentiary errors at trial require
reversal. 3 While these standards have long been critiqued, 4
recent scholarship on reliability that DNA-based exonerations
made possible substantially reinforces the claim. 5 Wrongful
convictions occur, in significant numbers, and the adversarial
orientation of police and prosecutors frequently precludes
self-correction. 6 Other avenues for ensuring accuracy thus merit
closer scrutiny, including the interstices where courts review
claims of error and consider reversing convictions. As cognizance
of wrongful convictions has grown, interest has increased in the
mechanisms of error correction and the safety valve that
appellate courts could provide. 7
The manner in which courts evaluate the reliability of
adjudication has also been illuminated by social science on the
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994) (stating that convictions shall not be
reversed for “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties”).
4. See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages:
The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 645 (2002) (“[I]f
Brady provides a sense of security that defendants are constitutionally entitled
to broad discovery, that sense of security is a false one.”); see also Donald A.
Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 899 (2013) (“Strickland has been
the subject of sustained academic criticism since it came down.”); Brandon L.
Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 39 (“[T]he Court has shifted the evidentiary burden of
proving error not harmless to criminal defendants by incorporating harmless
error rules into the context of fair trial rights.”).
5. See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 55 (2008) (providing one of the earliest systematic looks at the first 200
cases in which DNA evidence exonerated defendants).
6. See generally George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not
Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169
(2005); Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549.
7. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND.
L.J. 481, 481 (2009) (“After the exoneration of more than 200 people based on
post-conviction DNA evidence, a growing movement against wrongful
convictions has called increased attention to the prosecutorial suppression of
material exculpatory evidence.”).
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unfolding of facts, the structure of decision-making, and the
inevitability of biases. 8 In light of those developments, requiring
assessments of what “might have been” appears to leave a barrier
between reviewing courts and the root causes of error.
Underenforcement of discovery obligations, the right to counsel,
and exclusionary rules diminishes accuracy. And that
underenforcement occurs in part because hindsight standards
both preclude relief in individual cases 9 and impede reform. 10
Each of these standards has been revealed as having inconsistent
application and insufficient rigor, 11 and each suffers from a
similar disability. New vocabulary to discuss the weight of error
could help strike the balance between meaningful review and an
administrable reversal rate.
II. Finding the Blind Spot in Hindsight
Even as the incarceration rate attracts bipartisan
attention, 12 and scrutiny of investigative practices has given rise
to conviction integrity units in prosecutors’ offices, 13 the role of
judges considering trial errors continues to contract because of
habeas barriers and hindsight standards. Two developments in
the scholarship on criminal trials have brought into sharp relief
the problems with hindsight and this missed opportunity for
8. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
9. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (stating that the harmless error standard “create[s] a firewall
between constitutional rights and remedies”).
10. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless:
When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1995)
(“When we hold errors harmless, the rights of individuals, both constitutional
and otherwise, go unenforced . . . [and] the deterrent force of a reversal remains
unfelt by those who cause the error.”).
11. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1533, 1544 (2010) (“Scholars have repeatedly condemned Brady’s materiality
standard, often on the premise that it all too easily empowers overzealous
prosecutors to engage in gamesmanship to dodge their obligations to disclose.”).
12. Carl Hulse & Jennifer Steinhauer, Sentencing Overhaul Proposed in
Senate with Bipartisan Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, at A19.
13. See generally, e.g., CTR. FOR PROSECUTION INTEGRITY, CONVICTION
INTEGRITY UNITS: VANGUARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2014).
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more rigorous review: insights from cognitive psychology about
the way in which evidence is received, 14 and new data on
wrongful convictions. 15 Jurors reach verdicts according to a
complex process, and they respond to evidence in part through
unconscious biases that elide analysis. 16 Moreover, the strength
of any piece of evidence cannot be evaluated in isolation because
its weight and meaning arise from its relationship to other
evidence. A clearer understanding of the way in which
fact-finders make decisions reveals the impossibility of correctly
evaluating a completed trial in hindsight. At the same time,
greater awareness of the distribution of error at trial underscores
the need for a tighter safety net to catch prosecutors’ discovery
violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and wrongfully
admitted evidence.
A. Unpredictable Evidentiary Interactions
Experimental psychology has established that fact-finders do
not engage in an atomistic weighing of probabilities at trial; they
react to the evidence as a whole, in an integrated and non-linear
process. 17 Trials involve partial stories, intricate constellations of
facts dim and bright, complex decision-making by counsel about
strategy and presentation, and testimony that flows into other
14. See, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS 170 (2012) (describing how “persuasion is often dominated by
heuristic, superficial cues” including “associations, similarities, metaphors,
emotive appeals, and narrative ploys” and concluding that factfinders place
greater weight on these than on “analytic inferences that can be sustained by
the evidence”).
15. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION
COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012).
16. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 542 (1991)
(analyzing an experiment with mock jurors that demonstrated that “story
coherence, as determined by presentation order of evidence, affects verdict
decisions in a dramatic way”).
17. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L. J. 281,
295 (2013) (explaining that “jurors have preexisting conceptions that affect how
they process evidence, and that individual pieces of evidence interact with each
other in ways that influence meaning”).
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pieces of evidence the moment it emerges. 18 Preexisting narrative
constructs further affect how fact-finders receive and process
information. 19 Verdicts are thus an interactive process, in which
pieces of evidence alter each other when they come together, 20
and fact-finders themselves can change course through
deliberation with other jurors.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the sum of all of the
evidence and argument at trial creates a new whole. 21 In Old
Chief v. United States, the Court reasoned that the government
could present a narrative case “to convince the jurors that a
guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to
the discrete elements of a defendant’s legal fault.” 22 And in
Bruton v. United States, 23 the Court stated that jurors cannot
“segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes.” 24
Given the interdependence of evidence, it is both difficult to
understand what actually happened at a trial and all but
impossible to envision what might have happened at some
slightly different trial. The “legal truth” might not have been a
guilty verdict with additional impeachment material on key
18. See United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968)
(“The jury’s evaluation of the evidence relevant to a material proposition
requires a gestalt or synthesis which seldom needs to be analyzed
precisely . . . [and] must be interpreted in the context of all the evidence
introduced.”); see also ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 150 (1999)
(“Stories solve the problem of information overload by allowing a continuing
reintegration of new information and reorganization of that information
according to the changes in meaning that the new information allows or
requires.”); SIMON, supra note 14, at 175 (discussing the coherence effect and
“bidirectional reasoning, in which the facts guide the conclusion, while the
emergence of that conclusion reshapes the facts to become more coherent with
it”).
19. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 116
(2000) (considering the way in which narrative constructs reach the unconscious
and influence the perception of facts); see also Mark Kelman, Interpretive
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 593–96
(1981) (articulating the theory that narrative forms not only how facts are
perceived at trial but also what those facts actually “are”).
20. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (“Evidence
thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning . . . .”).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 188.
23. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
24. Id. at 131.
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prosecution witnesses, a superior defense lawyer, or the exclusion
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence like a coerced confession.
It is hard to say. One cannot step in the same river twice. 25 And
courts cannot accurately reconstruct or redirect the ebb and flow
of a completed trial.
Yet that reconstruction is precisely what hindsight standards
demand: a clear vision of an error-free trial that did not occur. On
direct appeal, or on state or federal habeas, judges are asked to
imagine a different trial than the one that took place. They must
then characterize the effect that the other, fictional trial would
have had on the initial fact-finders. The difficulty—if not
impossibility—of this task is compounded by the simple fact that
trials tend to occur in close cases with complex fact-finding. When
reviewing courts apply standards to those trials that require
hindsight, many errors evade scrutiny.
B. Bias v. Blindness
This blind spot presents different issues than the
well-documented problem of “hindsight bias.” Hindsight bias
makes past events seem inevitable and clearly predictable after
they have actually unfolded. 26 Decision-makers cannot suppress
the influence of known results on judgments but remain largely
unaware that outcome knowledge has altered their perception. 27
25. This is a saying widely attributed to early Greek philosopher
Heraclitus. See Daniel W. Graham, Heraclitus, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011) (“It is not possible to step twice into the
same river according to Heraclitus, or to come into contact twice with a mortal
being in the same state.”).
26. See Doron Teichman, The Hindsight Bias and the Law in Hindsight, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 354 (Doron
Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds., 2014) (providing an overview of the intersection
between the psychological literature on hindsight and legal scholarship); see also
Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) (discussing how knowledge of a
result affects the way an individual perceives past decisions); Baruch Fischhoff,
Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL. 288, 293 (1975) (documenting the existence of
hindsight bias). See generally Jay Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian
Wilhalm, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991) (recounting several studies of hindsight bias).
27. Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past
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Memory is a dynamic process, and awareness of a result
highlights evidence and information consistent with that result,
which makes the outcome appear much more likely at the earlier
point in time. Belief perseverance can then make judges doubt
the significance of facts that conflict with the status quo of a
conviction. 28 This bias in favor of the known outcome partially
explains the durability of wrongful convictions, sometimes even
after new evidence like DNA exonerates a defendant. 29 In a
broader sense, the confirmatory impulse known as hindsight bias
“leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers
alike to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all
evidence in a case through the lens provided by that
conclusion.” 30
Some legal judgments already recognize this hindsight
danger and reflect adjustments for the potential bias. 31 This
explains why, for example, after-acquired information is
generally barred from liability determinations. 32 And it also
figures in the assessment of whether an unnecessarily suggestive
identification process infected an eyewitness’s testimony. 33 The
Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 322 (1990); see
also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 202 (2011) (noting that
winning teams later appear much stronger than losing ones and that this new
perception alters the “view of the past as well as of the future”).
28. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 81 (describing experiments
showing the difficulty of “unbelieving” falsehoods); id. at 305 (“Loss aversion is a
powerful conservative force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in
the lives of both institutions and individuals.”).
29. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 316 (discussing
notorious cases of enduring wrongful convictions and the mechanisms by which
the guilt judgment “persisted on appeal and through postconviction proceedings,
tainting perspectives on the relative strength of the States’ and defendants’
cases”).
30. Id. at 292.
31. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 591, 620–24 (1998) (“When a court must
determine what someone ‘knew or should have known,’ it is especially likely to
fall prey to the hindsight bias.”).
32. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (barring admission of evidence concerning
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence, culpable conduct, defective
design, or the need for a warning).
33. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (listing the factors
that determine admissibility of identification testimony).
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phenomenon of 20/20 hindsight of course relates as well to
failures to overturn error. 34 But even though confirmatory bias
obstructs meaningful review of inadequacies in the criminal
justice process, it is not the primary obstacle.
Blindness rather than bias may be the most significant
impediment to review. When courts must determine whether a
decision-making process was sound despite an exposed error, the
hindsight they employ appears to offer a clear view but too often
is clouded. Courts can only speculate about the effect of error, and
it turns out that many errors they have deemed trivial may be
contributing to wrongful convictions.
C. The Error-Correction Imperative
Empirical evidence now reveals that hindsight standards
jeopardize not just the legitimacy of the finding of legal truth but
the accuracy of the “factual truth” as well. 35 Until recently, the
Supreme Court only rarely expressed any doubt “that a person
awarded the constitutional protections and found guilty by a jury
of peers might be anything but factually guilty.” 36 But in recent
scholarship made possible by DNA exonerations, the analysis of
wrongful convictions has established a significant population of
“known innocents” in the criminal justice system. 37 That
development has shifted the criminal procedure paradigm in
terms of the primacy of accuracy. Error leading to wrongful
34. See Findley & Scott, supra note 29, at 321 (“With hindsight knowledge
that a jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, judges are
likely to be predisposed to view the conviction as both inevitable and a sound
decision, despite a procedural or constitutional error in the proceedings.”).
35. See GARRETT, supra note 15, at 200–04 (noting that hundreds of cases
involving post-conviction exonerations through DNA evidence included a review
on direct appeal in which errors were deemed inconsequential or evidence of
guilt overwhelming).
36. Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 421, 426 (2014); see also United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Judge Learned Hand) (referring to the wrongfully convicted
defendant as a “ghost” haunting the criminal justice process like an “unreal
dream”).
37. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 37 (“Over the past decade, DNA
technology challenged the Court’s assumption of guilt with the postconviction
exoneration of mounting numbers of innocent people.”).
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convictions is now real rather than theoretical, and the debate no
longer involves speculation about the tolerable ratio of guilty
acquittals to unjust convictions. 38
Moreover, accounts of wrongful convictions increasingly
reach popular culture, 39 and the criminal justice system’s
“potential to convict and punish innocent people” has entered the
broader public consciousness. 40 The recent phenomenon of the
“Serial” podcast, for example, alerted millions of listeners to the
sometimes murky narrative that emerges in a criminal trial and
the difficult process of pairing factual and legal truth. 41
Though reliability has been called the “largely forgotten
purpose of the rules,” 42 the confirmed incidence of “actual
innocence” demands consideration of how particular practices
might relate to correct outcomes. 43 The actual rate of false
convictions remains unknowable. 44 DNA identification is not
38. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
358 (1765) (“Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“[A] fundamental value determination of our society is that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”); Alexander
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (discussing the
Blackstone Ratio).
39. See generally, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND
INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN (2006); JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD
COTTON & ERIN TOMEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND
REDEMPTION (2009).
40. Simon, supra note 36, at 428; see also Medwed, supra note 6, at 1551
(stating that the focus on innocence “by litigators, academics, legislators,
authors, and even television executives signals a new era in which fact-based
arguments surrounding guilt or innocence may begin to trump or at least hold
their own with the traditional rights-based arguments that have been the norm
in criminal law for generations”).
41. See, e.g., Matt Schiavenza, Serial’s Second Act, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 8,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/serials-second-act/
385287/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (noting defendant Adnan Syed’s pending
appeal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
42. Richard Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486.
43. See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice:
How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 133, 134, 147 (2008) (discussing the “Reliability Model” that
emerges from the “Innocence Movement”).
44. Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can’t, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at A14. But see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006)
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available in every case, and many serious crimes do not involve
the collection of DNA evidence. 45 But it is now apparent that
more (and more egregious) errors occur in the criminal justice
system than previously thought. The National Registry of
Exonerations documents 1,733 wrongful convictions that have
been exposed to date. 46 There have been 330 exonerations
obtained through post-conviction DNA testing, including twenty
defendants who had been sentenced to death. 47 Further, despite
rhetoric about the potential costs of wrongful acquittals
stemming from more rigorous procedures, there is no identifiable
population of “known guilties” who are wrongly acquitted to
compare to the growing dataset containing known innocents. 48 As
Brandon Garrett has explained, “[C]onstitutional error no longer
appears as a procedural technicality asserted by a probably guilty
defendant.” 49

(Scalia, J., concurring) (extrapolating from editorial and empirical challenges to
the existence of wrongful convictions to conclude that the error rate is actually
0.027%).
45. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531 (2005) (“Beneath the
surface there are other undetected miscarriages of justice in rape cases without
testable DNA, and a much larger group of undetected false convictions in
robberies and other serious crimes of violence for which DNA identification is
useless.”); see also Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and
Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on
Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 938 (2008) (“There are very few
exonerations among convictions for nonhomicidal crimes of violence for which
DNA evidence is of no value, for example, robbery.”).
46. National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited
Jan. 31, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
47. Cases:
DNA
Exoneree
Profiles,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/frontpage#c10=published&b_start= 0&c4+Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Oct. 11,
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. Nor are the costs of false convictions and false acquittals properly
viewed as “fixed quantities to be weighed against each other.” Daniel Epps, The
Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1093 (2015).
But see Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of
Error: Or, Is Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, 1
OXFORD STUD. PHIL. L. 195, 202 (2011) (attempting to quantify the cost of false
acquittals).
49. Garrett, supra note 5, at 38.

176

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (2016)

Accuracy, of course, is not the sole purpose or single-minded
focus of criminal adjudication. It serves other goals and
aspirations, including procedural fairness, individual autonomy,
privacy and privileged relationships, and even the correction of
some power disparities between the state and citizens. 50 The
“new reliability” scholarship, however, has brought correct
outcomes to the forefront. 51 It inspires discussion of best practices
for investigators, 52 underscores the scientific shortcomings of
some common forensic analyses, 53 and exposes the informational
and resource asymmetries that can preclude true adversarial
testing.
Yet the renewed imperative to achieve accurate results
seems at odds with the limited avenues for error correction at
later stages of criminal adjudication. Although Brady and
Strickland claims of error were designed to trigger reversal only
in a narrow band of cases, they were not intended to prevent any
review at all. 54 To be sure, there is a “strong aversion of appellate
and post-conviction courts to intervene in factual determinations
made at the trial level,” 55 but the rules have no force if frontline
institutional actors know that conduct is completely insulated
from review. 56 The understanding that once error occurs, it will
50. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in
Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 211 (2014) (“Adjudication’s traditional
purposes and rationales have been predominantly non-utilitarian.
Constitutional rights to introduce evidence and confront state witnesses serve
political norms that value individual autonomy and process participation,
independent of whether they improve accuracy in trial judgments.”).
51. Findley, supra note 43, at 134; Medwed, supra note 11, at 1550.
52. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of
Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to
Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 799, 805–06 (2013)
(arguing for complete recording of interrogations and for pretrial reliability
hearings to determine whether confessions are contaminated).
53. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False
Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
721, 721 (2007) (stating that criminal adjudication has “relied too readily upon
faulty forensic evidence like handwriting, ballistics, and hair and fiber
analysis”).
54. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
55. SIMON, supra note 14, at 212.
56. See Gregory Mitchell, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism:
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1366 (1994) (“[I]f
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rarely be rectified, has led to the recent establishment of
conviction integrity units to review potential errors, 57 and those
reviews have in turn informed investigative and prosecutorial
tactics in ongoing investigations. 58
Nonetheless, executive
self-correction still
happens
infrequently, and hindsight blindness should not preclude courts
from engaging in guided speculation about the impact of errors.
Reforms to date have focused largely on investigators and
prosecutors rather than reviewing courts. 59 Yet there are now
hundreds of cases that reveal the relationship between errors
that were not fully assessed and persistent false convictions. 60 As
applied, the current standards are afflicted by hindsight
blindness that can preclude the necessary holistic inquiry. And
this is especially concerning when the errors that appellate courts
are weighing involve practices that have long been understood as
related to accurate adjudication, such as the discovery of
exculpatory material or the adequacy of defense counsel.
III. Weighing Exculpatory Evidence
To begin with discovery obligations, due process imposes a
duty on prosecutors to turn over exculpatory information in the
possession of the government. Under Brady v. Maryland, 61
evidence favorable to an accused is discoverable if it is “material

committing an error has no adverse effect on the state, the deterrence of official
misbehavior becomes difficult.”).
57. Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Prosecutors Create Unit to Find Wrongful
Convictions, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/crime/dc-prosecutors-create-unit-to-find-wrongfulconvictions/2014/09/11/91a3722c-39da-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_story.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. See CTR. FOR PROSECUTION INTEGRITY, supra note 13 (discussing the
effectiveness of conviction integrity units across the United States).
59. Supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen:
Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 623 (2013)
(discussing the courts’ failure to value the cumulative effect of multiple small
exclusions like circumstantial evidence of non-matches between a perpetrator
and the defendant).
61. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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either to guilt or to punishment.” 62 Evidence is material if there
is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” 63 The standard is not just the lens through which the
court looks upon post-conviction review but the definition of the
government’s due process obligation. Almost every court, as well
as the Department of Justice, interpret the discovery requirement
itself as extending only to material evidence. 64 The definition of
material thus gives prosecutors flexibility—and causes reviewing
courts difficulty—because it is a hindsight decision as to whether
the suppression of evidence “undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.” 65
A. Hindsight About Foresight
The question starts out as one of foresight rather than
hindsight. Foresight is a familiar construct in decision-making
within the criminal justice process by investigators, prosecutors,
and judges. To take just a few examples, probable cause to seek a
search warrant, make an arrest, or charge a crime requires a
prediction about the evidence that will be found or the likelihood
of guilt. 66 Judges also routinely evaluate the admissibility of
62. Id. at 87.
63. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
64. Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative
Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 646 (2013). For examples from lower courts
that have imposed broader discovery requirements, see United States v.
Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[T]he government must always
produce any potentially exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence without
regard to how the withholding of such evidence might be viewed—with the
benefit of hindsight—as affecting the outcome of the trial.”); United States v.
Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005) (“Simply because ‘material’
failures to disclose exculpatory evidence violate due process does not mean only
‘material’ disclosures are required.”); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“T]he post-trial review determines only whether the
improper suppression of evidence violated the defendant’s due process rights.
However, that the suppression may not have been sufficient to violate due
process does not mean that it was proper.”).
65. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
66. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (defining
probable cause as “where the facts and circumstances within the officers’
knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are
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evidence by assessing what effect it might have on a jury. 67 But a
Brady claim adds a challenging layer. Not only must the
prosecutor show foresight to comply, but the judge then uses
hindsight about that foresight to determine whether there has
been a violation. 68 The limitations of hindsight already inhibit the
evaluation whether a particular failure to disclose could have
altered the course of a now-completed trial, and judges further
consider whether a prosecutor would have anticipated the
hypothetical course change at the time that the evidence was
withheld.
Prosecutors acting in bad faith can find shelter behind this
layered standard, and even those acting in good faith cannot
apply it consistently. They interpret facts within their
adversarial role, and potentially exculpatory evidence may not
undermine their confidence in the defendant’s guilt. Indeed,
prosecutors are supposed to be convinced of a defendant’s guilt
before seeking charges and thus necessarily engage with the
Brady standard through a lens clouded by cognitive bias. 69
Exculpatory evidence will of course appear meaningless or
unconvincing, and the materiality element makes it easy to
suppress. Starting out with an adversarial view of the case and
sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that
a crime is being committed”).
67. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (giving trial courts discretion to exclude evidence
where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect).
68. See Green, supra note 64, at 646 (“[A] federal prosecutor who seeks
merely to abide by the constitutional minimum must predict before trial what a
court will say after trial about the utility of favorable evidence in the
[G]overnment’s possession.” (emphasis added)). The “inevitable discovery”
doctrine applicable to the Fourth Amendment provides an analogue, according
to which law enforcement, in possession of evidence after an illegal search, can
argue that the evidence should not be suppressed because the investigation
would eventually have uncovered that evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 444 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception).
69. Burke, supra note 7, at 494–96; see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving
Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593–1601 (2006) (explaining how confirmation bias,
selective information processing, belief perseverance, and avoiding cognitive
dissonance affect prosecutorial decision-making); KEITH A. FINDLEY & BARBARA
O’BRIEN, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES: COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING 36
(2014) (“[P]eople interpret information, form questions, and search for
additional evidence in a way that supports existing beliefs without even
knowing that they are doing so.”).

180

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (2016)

then attempting to determine ex ante what the import of a piece
of evidence might turn out to be is extremely difficult. 70
It is then all but impossible for courts to critique that
decision ex post. Courts must look back at the trial and consider
whether suppressed evidence would have changed the outcome,
and whether, in retrospect, it appears that prosecutors should
have prospectively recognized the value and relevance of the
evidence at issue. Even evidence that does not clearly call the
conviction into question might have mitigated blame or modified
the jury’s perception of other evidence. Meaning is produced from
the interaction between pieces of evidence and other facts and
argument in the case, as well as preexisting narrative schemes to
which individual fact-finders have been exposed. 71 Missing
details may matter a great deal, and “true-but-incomplete
account[s]” may seriously mislead. 72 As Justice Marshall wrote in
Bagley, 73 the “private whys and wherefores of jury deliberations
pose an impenetrable barrier to our ability to know just which
piece of information might make, or might have made, a
difference.” 74 Accordingly, there is no way to evaluate whether a
prosecutor’s forecast of the effect any one piece of evidence might
have on a trial fell short. Yet most scholarship and reform
initiatives focused on Brady violations address whether to expand
70. As Scott Sundby points out, there may even be an inherently unethical
quality to Brady compliance under the current stringent materiality standard. A
prosecutor only need turn over a piece of evidence if she concludes that it is “so
exculpatory in nature that it actually undermines [her] belief that a guilty
verdict would be worthy of confidence.” Sundby, supra note 4, at 651. But
having turned it over, she is supposed to resume “zealous efforts to obtain a
guilty verdict” that she has just concluded would not be worthy of confidence. Id.
71. See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND.
L. REV. 143, 198 (2011) (“[E]vidence is likewise influenced by the other evidence
in the case, [even] absent any rational connection between the items.”); Robert
P. Burns, A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues in Evidence Law, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2008) (“[A] single additional detail, and
certainly a constellation of additional details, can substantially change the
significance of the stories told at trial.”).
72. Susan Haack, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth, 32 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 20, 30 (2008); see also id. at 31 (explaining that “the effect of telling
only part of the truth” can be “to slant or skew the audience’s perception of the
larger truth that is not told”).
73. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
74. Id. at 682.
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prosecutorial obligations and mechanisms to ensure compliance, 75
rather than the approach that courts should take to determine
whether there has been a violation.
B. The Example of Impeachment
Perhaps the most challenging factual context is the question
of impeachment evidence under Brady. Giglio v. United States 76
requires that prosecutors provide defendants with any material
evidence that tends to impeach the credibility of government
witnesses. 77 But the significance of impeachment material will
not strike every institutional actor and fact-finder in the same
way. 78 As with exculpatory information, “it is the job of the
defense, not the prosecution, to decide whether and in what way
to use” impeachment. 79 Layers of inference determine the
potential import of impeachment material such as prior
inconsistent statements, incentives to cooperate with the
government, substance abuse and mental health issues, or
potential animosity toward a defendant. Its exculpatory force will
depend on which witnesses ultimately testify, how pivotal their
testimony will be, whether impeaching them will successfully
diminish their credibility in the eyes of fact-finders, and the
significance of the impeached testimony in the context of other
evidence in the case. Moreover, exposing one untrustworthy

75. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(2015) (summarizing scholarship on Brady reform that calls for a broader scope
to the obligation, more sanctions for violations, or improved organizational
dynamics within prosecuting offices).
76. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
77. See id. (extending the Brady obligation to disclose favorable evidence to
“any understanding or agreement” concerning a testifying witness’s future
prosecution). Disclosure of impeachment material is not, however, mandatory at
the plea bargaining stage where most crucial decisions are made. United States
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
78. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (recognizing a defendant’s
constitutional right “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole
triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness”).
79. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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witness might diminish and detract from the prosecution’s case
overall, 80 but to an unpredictable extent.
For instance, in United States v. Bagley, 81 the prosecution
failed to reveal payments that government witnesses received in
exchange for cooperation. 82 While rather obviously impeachment
material, that evidence may or may not have made any difference
in the case if it had been disclosed. The judges reviewing the case
reached no consensus themselves on whether the suppressed
material was significant. 83 In a self-contained demonstration of
the hollowness of the materiality standard, the district court
concluded that the impeachment material was not subject to
disclosure, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, and the Supreme Court
reversed. 84 More recently, in Smith v. Cain, 85 the prosecutor
insisted at oral argument, to an increasingly incredulous Court,
that inconsistent statements by the only eyewitness were not
necessarily material to the case. 86
Another illustration comes from a 2013 Ninth Circuit case
involving a conviction for producing the chemical ricin for use as
a weapon. 87 Prosecutors failed to reveal that the forensic science
at the heart of the government’s case was prepared by an analyst
who had been found “incompetent and [had] committed gross
misconduct.” 88 The court concluded, however, that the
defendant’s intent—based on web sites he had visited, notes he
took, and books he bought—was so clearly established that
knowledge of the scientist’s discharge would not have changed
the outcome. 89 In dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc,
80. See SIMON, supra note 14, at 176 (“[D]iscrediting an evidence item
results in the weakening of other evidence items supporting the same side.”).
81. 473 U.S. at 667.
82. Id. at 682.
83. Id. at 684.
84. Id.
85. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
86. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627
(2012) (No. 10-8145) (statement of Justice Ginsburg) (“But how could it not be
material? Here is the only eyewitness. . . . Are you really urging that the prior
statements were immaterial?”).
87. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
88. Id. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 633.
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Judge Kozinski wrote that there is no difference between this
analysis and concluding that it is “possible” that the defendant
would have been convicted anyway. 90
C. The Problem with Materiality
The Court has long sowed this confusion about whether the
omitted evidence itself must raise reasonable doubt to be
material, or whether some scenario under which it might have
interacted with other evidence to trigger a different course of
events suffices. 91 Not surprisingly, the lower courts have
articulated the level of certainty about outcome effect in a variety
of ways. 92 The easier question—because the answer is almost
always “no”—is whether a defendant can prove that the result
would have been different, and that seems to be the
burden-shifting inquiry in which most courts engage. 93 Judges
are predisposed to view a conviction as correct, and that cognitive
bias is compounded by the structural characteristics of the Brady
standard.
Not only the epistemic challenges but also the innocence
empirics support reform of that standard. Discovery under Brady
serves the “general goal of establishing procedures under which
criminal defendants are acquitted or convicted on the basis of all
90. Id. at 630.
91. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–13 (1976) (“[T]he omission
must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable
doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is
no justification for a new trial.”).
92. For example, among the thirty-seven federal districts with a local rule
or order governing Brady, nineteen attempt a definition of Brady material, and
five state that materiality is irrelevant to its application. FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES,
ORDERS AND POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (2007); see also Robert
Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1679 (1996) (“Left to their own devices, lower courts are in
disarray over the precise scope of Brady duties and the proper rationales behind
them.”).
93. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441 (1995) (“In this case,
disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent counsel would have made a
different result reasonably probable.”).
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the evidence which exposes the truth.” 94 In general terms,
thorough disclosure of potentially exculpatory information
preserves the burden of proof, enables the assistance of counsel,
and supports other fairness guarantees. 95 More specifically,
Brandon Garrett’s study of wrongful convictions concludes that
“in thirty-four percent of all exonerations, police suppressed
exculpatory evidence, and prosecutors did so in thirty-seven
percent of all exonerations.” 96
Some of those cases involve deliberate suppression of
evidence. The Brady standard gets substantial attention for
enabling strategic behavior by prosecutors, and recent
scholarship has focused on compliance issues. 97 But high profile
cases—such as those concerning abuses in the New Orleans
District Attorney’s Office, 98 or the alleged excesses of the federal
prosecutions of Senator Stevens 99 or W.R. Grace 100—do not
94. Id. at 440 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 900–01 (1984)).
95. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).
96. Garrett, supra note 5, at 69 n.173.
97. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the
Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2090 (2010) (stating that Brady
violations are “one of the most common types of prosecutorial misconduct”).
98. See generally Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012); Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
99. In the 2009 Stevens case, the Department of Justice dismissed a public
corruption indictment because of discovery violations, including the failure to
disclose prior statements by a government witness that impeached his
testimony. Charlie Savage & Michael S. Schmidt, Inner Workings of Senator’s
Troubled Trial Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A19; see also Prosecution
of Senator Ted Stevens, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS (NACDL),
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=23885 (last visited Oct. 29,
2015) (“Senator Ted Stevens was prosecuted and convicted for criminal ethics
violations, subsequently lost his re-election campaign, and, only shortly before
his tragic passing, was exonerated after a whistleblower revealed that
prosecutors withheld critical evidence of the Senator’s innocence in violation of
his constitutional rights.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
100. When the jury was instructed that the government similarly failed to
disclose witness statements, that instruction apparently contributed to the 2009
acquittal of W.R. Grace and three of its former executives who had been charged
with environmental crimes. United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1177,
1178 (D. Mont. 2006); Kirk Johnson, Asbestos Prosecution Results in Acquittals,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A10. In the wake of these cases, the Department of
Justice issued new guidelines on prosecutorial discovery obligations. See
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Dep’t
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accurately represent the scope of systemic failure. The standard
itself is inherently flawed and makes the ordinary, mistaken
suppression of evidence unreachable.
State discovery rules have begun to employ broader
standards that minimize self-serving reasoning by police and
prosecutors, 101 and another proposal for reform would allow
courts to identify such reasoning more readily by shifting the
materiality inquiry from impact to potential. The relevance of
evidence is substantially more accessible to the court’s review
than the force it might have had. Because the subjectivity of
fact-finders provides the link between evidence and a guilt
judgment, any piece of evidence that might be favorable, or could
impeach the testimony of a government witness, has at least
potential significance. 102
One analogue can be found in the fraud context, where it has
long been the government’s position that statements are material
if they “could have” deceived, without regard to whether they
actually did. 103 Focusing on the capacity that exculpatory
information has, rather than calculating the likelihood that it
Prosecutors,
Regarding
Crim.
Discovery
(Jan.
10,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors (last visited
Oct. 29, 2015) (stating that prosecutors should take a broad view of materiality
and err on the side of disclosing exculpatory and impeachment evidence) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Those measures, of course, still
leave prosecutors “in charge of deciding what evidence will be material to the
defense.” Hon. Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PRO. iii, iv–vi (2015); cf. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S.
2197, 112th Cong. (2012) (requiring disclosure of all information “that may
reasonably appear to be favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution”).
101. See, e.g., The Michael Morton Act, S. 1611, 2013 Leg., 83rd Sess. (Tex.
2013) (adopting an “open file” criminal discovery regime to encourage
prosecutorial disclosures).
102. Similar standards have been advanced in professional responsibility
codes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (2012) (requiring the
disclosure of all evidence that “tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense” without regard to materiality); see also ABA Standing
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/
2015/May/Conference/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.authcheckdam.pdf
(establishing a similar standard for broader disclosure).
103. Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999) (explaining that a
statement is material if “a reasonable man would attach importance to its
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question” (internal citation omitted)).
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would have an impact at trial, makes sense here as well. 104 As in
contexts like fraud and false statements, the potential connection
between the undisclosed evidence and the question of defendant’s
guilt could control, instead of what will inevitably be conflicting
assessments of its likely probative force. What, after all, is the
harm in mandating disclosure of some evidence that is relevant
but not necessarily favorable? Even if that approach leads to
over-disclosure, there is no conceivable detriment to the
government’s case, and considerable benefit to Brady compliance
overall.
Various codes of professional responsibility reflect this
insight and make all evidence that “tends to negate guilt”
discoverable. 105 Some even explicitly set aside materiality
considerations. 106 Other proposed standards include the
disclosure of “all evidence or information that [prosecutors]
reasonably believe will be helpful to the defense or that could
lead to admissible evidence.” 107 No such proposal has gained
traction in the courts, however. In fact, the relevance concept
echoes a position from Justice Marshall’s 1985 Bagley opinion
that has largely languished in dissent since. 108
104. See United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979)
(providing that “intrinsic capabilities” rather than ultimate effect of a false
statement determine its materiality); cf. United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452,
455 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding a false statement material even though it was “so
ludicrous that no IRS agent would believe [it]”).
105. See Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1961, 2030 n.83 (2010) (“[T]he Brady duty runs to the State generally, whereas
the ethical duty is personal to the prosecutor and is only triggered to the extent
the prosecutor knows of information that tends to negate guilt or mitigate the
offense.”).
106. See id. at 1998 (noting that a prosecutor may “instruct[] all the
attorneys in his office to focus on ‘favorability’ questions, while ignoring the
issue of ‘materiality’”).
107. Id. at 1971; see also Green, supra note 64, at 641 (discussing the 2012
Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, which would require prosecutors to turn
over all potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant, without regard to
materiality).
108. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 712 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“Even though the prosecution suppressed evidence that was
specifically requested, apparently the Court of Appeals may now reverse only if
there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the suppressed evidence ‘would’ have
altered ‘the result of the [trial].’”).
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Yet the connection between the Brady obligation and the
course of trial as a “quest for truth” rather than a “sporting
event” is newly relevant in light of heightened awareness of
error. 109 Accordingly, rather than use the hindsight that
materiality requires, courts might consider the relevance of
undisclosed evidence in light of the factual record, without
attempting to weigh its actual effect on a trial in which it never
surfaced. The import of undisclosed evidence might then turn on
the closeness of its connection to the facts rather than its
speculative force at trial.
IV. Considering the Adequacy of Counsel
The limitations of hindsight standards have similarly
affected courts’ review of the adequacy of defense counsel under
the Sixth Amendment. The “skill and knowledge” of defense
counsel is inextricably linked to whether a trial provides a
“reliable adversarial testing process.” 110 But the Strickland v.
Washington111 standard by which defense counsel is measured
requires first that a defendant demonstrate that counsel’s
performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness
and second that the deficient performance “materially” affect the
outcome of the case. 112 Claims of ineffectiveness depend on a
showing that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
109. Id. at 693; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963) (“[S]hall
we continue to regard the criminal trial as ‘in the nature of a game or sporting
contest’ and not ‘a serious inquiry aiming to distinguish between guilt and
innocence’?”); Colin P. Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent
in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 158–59
(2012) (analyzing conflicts in substantive and procedural due process in relation
to the Brady framework); New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations, supra note 105, at 1964 (“[P]rosecutorial disclosure is necessary to
promote the public interest in achieving fair trials and reliable outcomes in the
criminal justice system.”).
110. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); see also United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (stating that the presence of defense
counsel tests the government’s case and thereby produces more accurate
results).
111. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
112. Id. at 687.
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relied on as having produced a just result.” 113 Thus, even once a
defendant has met the weighty burden of demonstrating
inadequate performance, she must go on to establish that those
errors “actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” 114 This is
the functional equivalent of showing that exculpatory information
was withheld in violation of Brady, and in addition that the
exculpatory evidence in question would have materially affected
the outcome of trial. In other words, given a record that reveals a
demonstrably inferior advocate, courts must still decide whether
a superior one would have produced a different result.
A. The Structure of Strickland
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are simultaneously
the most commonly brought 115—occurring far more frequently
than Brady contentions—and among the most difficult to prove.
The Strickland Court took note of the potential hindsight
problem, but only with regard to the evaluation of attorney
performance, and only in the direction of affirmance. 116 The Court
discussed what social scientists would call “outcome bias,” which
in this context is the belief that an attorney should have known
how a particular strategy would play out because it appears so
clearly ill-advised after the fact. 117 Referring to the “distorting
effects of hindsight,” the Court concluded that a “fair assessment
of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate [it].” 118 As a result, there is a “strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
113. Id. at 686.
114. Id. at 693.
115. See Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122
YALE L.J. 2428, 2439 (2013) (discussing filing rates for independent assistance of
counsel claims).
116. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
117. See id. (“[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge
the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”).
118. Id.; see also Guthrie et al., supra note 8, at 800 (stating that the
“hindsight bias likely influences findings of ineffective assistance of counsel” in
the sense that “decisions a lawyer makes in the course of representing a
criminal defendant can seem less competent after the defendant has been
convicted”).
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professional assistance.” 119 Under that standard, however, post
hoc rationalizations for poor attorney decisions are at least as
likely as hindsight bias arising from outcome knowledge. Even
where counsel’s errors probably cost a defendant an acquittal, a
reviewing court can conclude that the “overall representation
[was] not bad enough to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness.” 120
The Strickland Court made no mention of the hindsight
blindness that renders the prejudice prong an even more
substantial hurdle. Cognitive constraints, however, preclude a
clear view of the trial, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether a better lawyer would have achieved a
favorable verdict. The most significant confirmatory bias is the
one that makes conviction seem inevitable despite the quality of
the lawyering. 121 Strickland’s prejudice prong requires the court
to determine whether incompetent counsel mattered, but
hindsight blindness hampers its ability to do so and almost
always leads to affirmance. 122
This is a notable oversight when the Court has otherwise
displayed its awareness of the interwoven effects of attorney
performance. For instance, when deciding that the denial of a
paid attorney of the defendant’s choice required reversal, the
Court wrote that different counsel
will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation
and discovery, development of the theory of the defense,
selection of the jury, presentation of the witnesses, . . . style of
witness examination and jury argument . . . [and] whether and

119. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also id. at 688–89 (“No particular set of
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety
of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”).
120. George C. Thomas, III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 553.
121. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense
counsel.”).
122. See id. (“[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted
after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if
his lawyer had been competent.”).
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on what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution,
plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial. 123

Counsel’s inadequacy is similarly integrated with the entire
course of trial. Indeed, lawyers themselves “often have difficulty
explaining precisely why a certain witness was called to testify
and another was not, or why one line of defense was pursued and
another was avoided.” 124
It was not until the Court’s recent decisions extending the
Strickland standard to the plea bargaining context, 125 however,
that the Court even acknowledged that hindsight pervades the
prejudice prong as well. And there, objecting to the Court’s
decision in favor of the defendant, Justice Scalia stated that
prejudice would be determined “by a process of retrospective
crystal-ball gazing posing as legal analysis.” 126 Hindsight
generally works against defendants, however. Reviewing courts
rarely articulate counterfactuals that lead to acquittal. That they
reach different results on similar fact patterns illuminates the
subjective nature of the inquiry. Moreover, as with Brady
violations, courts apply the burden to show outcome effects
inconsistently. 127
A very narrow set of deficiencies does fall into the category of
presumed prejudice. 128 Some deprivations are so fundamentally
unfair that the court need not even inquire about their impact,
including the absence of counsel, the refusal of counsel to
participate in the proceedings, and a conflict of interest that
precludes counsel from acting as an advocate. 129 In these
123. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
124. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV 988,
990 (1973).
125. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
126. Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012)
(requiring the defendant to show a “substantial” and not just a “conceivable”
likelihood of a different result).
128. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (finding that
“complete denial” of the assistance of counsel constitutes per se prejudice),
abrogated on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26
(2000).
129. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (“A guilty plea is open
to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with
‘reasonably competent advice.’ Furthermore, court procedures that restrict a
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categories, the defendant is not required to make a showing of
actual prejudice. 130 The complete or constructive denial of counsel
will thus lead to reversal regardless of the reliability of the
underlying verdict. But because of the actual prejudice standard
that otherwise applies, claims about a defense lawyer who was
present, but might as well have stayed home, will rarely
succeed. 131
Take defense counsel in Muniz v. Smith, 132 who fell asleep
during the cross-examination of the defendant. 133 That
examination reached a critical point when the defendant made
ill-advised statements that ultimately led to the admission of a
previously suppressed 911 call by his mother and laid the
groundwork for a state rebuttal witness as well. 134 Presumably,
had counsel been both wide awake and constitutionally adequate,
the line of questioning concerning the credibility of other
witnesses would have drawn an objection. The hindsight-based
Strickland inquiry, however, did not provide relief because the
significance of timely objections, or even an artful
cross-examination, is simply unknowable. 135 The Sixth Circuit
held here, for example, that there was no showing of prejudice
lawyer’s tactical decision to put the defendant on the stand unconstitutionally
abridge the right to counsel.” (citations omitted)).
130. Id.
131. See Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that a
habitually intoxicated lawyer—notorious for drinking during the time period of
the trial but not actually in court—was not constitutionally ineffective because
the petitioner could not show specific instances of deficient performance due to
alcohol consumption); Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 515, 542–43 (2009) (concluding that the Strickland standard
shields “a wide array of stunningly incompetent and unprofessional
representation”). But cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1995) (“[T]he
Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is
unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair decision on the merits.”); Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (stating that counsel’s error in failing “to
investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence” could prejudice
defendant by precipitating a guilty plea).
132. 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011).
133. Id. at 622.
134. Id. at 624–25.
135. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1994) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible . . . to ascertain
[if the prosecution’s case] would have stood up against rebuttal and
cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.”).
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under Strickland, and that presumed prejudice only arises when
a lawyer sleeps through a “substantial portion of defendant’s
trial.” 136 A brief nap during a short cross-examination did not
raise a “reasonable probability of a different outcome.” 137
B. Obstacles to Enforcement
Even in recent cases where the Court has expanded the
possibility of constitutionally inadequate assistance—including
the failure to advise defendants entering guilty pleas of the
collateral consequences of deportation, 138 exceedingly poor advice
about rejecting a plea offer, 139 or the failure to even convey a plea
offer 140—the prejudice prong remains an obstacle to
enforcement. 141 The 2012 Lafler 142 and Frye 143 decisions require
assessment of the adequacy of counsel during plea bargaining,
and this new set of considerations could make inroads into the
problems with the standard itself. There are, however, more
objective metrics of the effect of bad advice during plea
bargaining than with regard to poor lawyering at trial. This is so
because a defendant convicted at trial will typically receive a
higher sentence than was offered in a plea agreement. 144 In the
Frye case, for example, there was a “reasonable probability” that
the defendant would have accepted the lesser plea because he
ultimately pleaded guilty to a more serious charge with no
136. Muniz, 647 F.3d at 623.
137. Id. at 625.
138. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010).
139. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012).
140. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).
141. See id. (“To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where
a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient
performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they would
have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance
of counsel.”); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (discussing the injuries experienced by
defendants who “decline a plea offer as a result of ineffective assistance of
counsel”).
142. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376.
143. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399.
144. See Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693,
732–38 (2011) (discussing the meaning of prejudice in the context of plea
bargaining).
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promise of a sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor. 145
In the Lafler case, the defendant was made aware of the plea
offer but got patently bad counsel about whether to accept it,
including an incorrect explanation of the burden of proof for
intent to murder. 146 The defendant then received a harsher
sentence after trial than the one offered in the plea. 147
There is little record of what occurs during plea bargaining,
however, and it will not always be sufficiently apparent what the
defendant would have done, especially before being confronted
with the strength of the prosecution’s case. Many defendants
resist rational choices to accept pleas until trial begins, at which
point their peril is more apparent, and they will even “plead
blind” without any agreement in the hope of some mitigation
from the court. Nonetheless, Lafler and Frye require that
defendants show not only that the plea offer would have been
attractive but also that it would have been adhered to by the
prosecution and accepted by the trial court. 148 Historical practice
might inform the assessment of whether prosecutors would have
honored bargains and courts would have accepted them. Though
still hindsight review, that is less speculative than determining
whether a strategic error affected a particular jury’s deliberations
and decision.
Still, how to restore both the prosecution and the defense to
the positions they would have occupied absent the constitutional
violation remains a difficult remedial question. As Justice Scalia
objected in Frye, it is conceivable that the application of hindsight
standards to ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to plea
bargaining will benefit some defendants who were not disposed to

145. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404–05.
146. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (describing counsel’s advice that “the
prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder [the victim]
because she had been shot below the waist”).
147. Id. at 1383.
148. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (concluding that the defendant likely would
have accepted the plea offer if it had been communicated to him, but that he
failed to overcome the Court’s “strong reason to doubt [whether] the prosecution
and the trial court would have permitted the plea bargain to become final”); see
also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (determining that the defendant satisfied the
deficient performance prong of Strickland by showing that he likely would have
accepted the plea offer if he had not been ill-advised).
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plead guilty. 149 It will only be the rare case in which a plea offer
sits idle for a month, or a lawyer clearly neglects to explain the
strength of the prosecution’s case, but almost every defendant
convicted at trial can claim that she would have accepted a plea
agreement. As a result, requiring effective assistance of counsel
at the plea bargaining stage seems momentous but may not
break substantial new ground in terms of the scope of the right to
counsel and the overall quality of representation. 150
What the reasoning in Lafler and Frye could achieve,
however, is enlarged thinking about what it means to have an
impact on the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Extending
Strickland to plea agreements requires some new consideration of
the difficulty with identifying the effect of errors and omissions.
And that in turn suggests revised approaches to hindsight
constraints in other contexts. To include the result of plea
bargaining in the range of prejudicial errors at least hints at a
broader and more holistic view of criminal adjudication as a
process with a spectrum of possible conclusions. The injustice of a
wrongful conviction sits at one end, and perhaps the highly
speculative windfall of a wrongful acquittal on the other. But in
between may be unfair procedures despite accurate results, a
split verdict that the jury might reach, and sentences and
collateral consequences that vary in severity for the defendant. If
defendants should not experience shifts along that spectrum
without adequate counsel within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment—and Lafler and Frye suggest that they should not—
then “correct” outcomes do not excuse many other instances of
deficient lawyering that currently elide review.
Even an error-free trial or a subsequent voluntary plea that
follows the ill-considered decision to reject a plea cannot cure
inadequate defense lawyering. 151 And if that is the case, it
expands the potential claims about prejudice. Perhaps at other
points in the trial as well—including when the court admits
149.
150.

Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 39 (2012) (“Finally, we know that the heavens will not fall as a result of
Frye and Lafler, because the cases’ rule is ‘new’ only to the Supreme Court.”).
151. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (rejecting the argument that “[a] fair trial
wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea
bargaining”).

HINDSIGHT BLIND SPOTS

195

evidence, when a jury is empaneled, and when a sentence is
imposed—courts will begin to connect ineffective assistance of
counsel to materially worse positions for defendants.
Recognizing that the inadequacy of counsel amplifies other
errors and disadvantages for defendants also begins a
conversation about whether hindsight standards have masked
systemic problems and prevented reforms. 152 The fiftieth
anniversary of the Gideon 153 decision extending the right to
counsel to indigent defendants has occasioned a broader
discussion of the crisis in public defense. 154 While there are some
prosecutors who leverage the Brady standard to avoid discovery
obligations, defense lawyers do not set out to be ineffective. Yet a
distressingly large number of defendants do not receive
constitutionally adequate counsel. Indeed, one study concluded
that, at least in relatively uncomplicated cases, pro se defendants
may achieve better results than counseled ones. 155 The
hindsight-based prejudice standard is one of the obstacles to
thinking beyond individual case outcomes to broader system
failure.
Absent consequences for ineffective lawyering, there is little
incentive for the criminal justice system to allocate increased
resources and address that shortfall. As Donald Dripps writes,
“Legislatures disinclined to fund indigent defense know that the
failure to provide effective representation will lead to the reversal
of few if any convictions.” 156 A more expansive standard, less
encumbered by hindsight analysis, could do more to underscore

152. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676,
2687–91 (2013) (attributing the failures of the system of public defense in part
to the Strickland standard).
153. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
154. See KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR
PEOPLE’S JUSTICE (2013) (documenting the crisis for public defenders, who serve
more than 80% of criminal defendants, and are severely overworked and
underfunded).
155. Erica Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An
Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447–50
(2007).
156. Dripps, supra note 4, at 903; see also Smith, supra note 131, at 544
(“[A] toothless constitutional standard of effective representation . . . virtually
invites legislatures to continue underfunding indigent defense.”).
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the way in which caseloads and resource constraints prevent
effective advocacy. 157
A wholesale response to the familiar “broken system” story at
first sounds purely aspirational. But it could gain some
momentum from the empirical evidence that ineffective
assistance of counsel contributes to retail inaccuracy. Brandon
Garrett reports that ineffective assistance of counsel claims were
raised in 32% of the cases in his database of DNA exonerations. 158
Among those wrongful convictions were fifty-two adjudicated
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, only four of which
produced a reversal of the conviction, and all of which involved a
lawyer whose representation was so egregiously below the
constitutional standard that he was subsequently disbarred. 159
If one understands the right to counsel as deontological
rather than consequential, any trial in which defense counsel
fails to meet certain performance benchmarks may be
insufficiently “fair” regardless of the correctness of the outcome.
Even under the deferential standards of post-conviction review,
counsel sleeping during the defendant’s cross-examination or
failing to test forensic evidence warrants reversal. 160 There is a
baseline below which counsel’s performance should never dip,
particularly in death penalty cases. Yet Strickland’s hindsight
157. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20–21 (1997) (asserting that
the Strickland standard “leaves no room” for system-wide assessments, and that
the case-by-case approach makes it difficult to even separate “low-activity but
good representation from laziness or incompetence”); id. at 20 (“Defendants tend
to win ineffective assistance of counsel claims only when their lawyers had a
conflict of interest or made some discrete error of great magnitude.”).
158. GARRETT, supra note 15, at 205; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for
the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer,
103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1870 (1994) (describing the low number of lawyers who are
willing to commit to indigent defense in capital cases). Justice Ginsburg has also
made the noteworthy observation that she has “yet to see a death case, among
the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which
the defendant was well represented at trial.” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In
Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care, the Joseph L. Rah, Jr. Lecture
at the Univ. of the D.C., David A. Clarke Sch. of Law, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE
UNITED STATES
(Apr.
9,
2001), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_04-09-01a (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. GARRETT, supra note 15, at 205–06.
160. Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2011).
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component allows post-conviction reviewing courts to ignore cases
in which defense counsel was barely more than present. 161
Though a requirement of reasonably competent counsel in every
case is a long way off, it would be closer if hindsight figured less
in the equation, and defendants did not bear the burden of
showing that the trial would actually have proceeded differently
with a superior advocate.
V. Determining the Significance of Error
Both the Brady and the Strickland standards resemble the
broader category of harmless error analysis, which similarly ties
reversal to a hindsight evaluation. As with the “materiality” and
“prejudice” inquiries, reviewing courts weigh the “harmfulness” of
trial errors by looking back at a trial that never took place. For
example, courts excise erroneously admitted evidence and then
determine whether the evidence that remains appears adequate.
A. Quantitative Assessments of Impact
With regard to most trial errors, including the erroneous
introduction and exclusion of evidence, reversal occurs only
where a “substantial right of the party is affected.” 162 If a court
“concludes with fair assurance” that the judgment “was not
substantially swayed by the error,” then the defendant’s
conviction will stand. 163 A higher standard applies to
161. See Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786–87
(1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY AND
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998))
(citing examples of borderline incompetence under Strickland, including the
attorney not being sober or awake); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689 (1984) (stating that the application of the professional reasonableness
standard must be highly deferential).
162. See FED R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).
163. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see id. at 764–65
(“If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment
should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm
or a specific command of Congress.”).
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constitutional errors, which the court must find harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. 164 In theory, the Chapman standard for
reviewing constitutional errors places a considerable burden on
the government to demonstrate that the error did not “contribute
to the verdict,” but in practice the same hindsight disability
obstructs review. 165 And errors are still further insulated from
analysis by the procedural requirements of federal habeas claims.
Under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 166 an error must have a
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.” 167
Only structural errors—which include the complete absence
of counsel, denial of the right to self-representation or to paid
counsel of one’s choice, a biased judge, a defective reasonable
doubt instruction, denial of a public trial, and racial
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury—lead to
automatic reversal. 168 Although the Court recognizes structural
errors as “[d]efects in the constitution of the trial mechanism
itself,” 169 the category is narrow, and even a conviction tainted by
a coerced confession can be upheld if the Chapman test is met. 170
This is so because the Supreme Court has reasoned that
constitutional errors that occur during the presentation of the
case may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
164. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1967).
165. See id. at 24 (“[C]onstitutional error, in illegally admitting highly
prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person
prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless.”).
166. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
167. Id. at 623. In addition, a habeas court applies “doubly deferential”
review, even of quite serious errors, asking only whether a state court got an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim “reasonably right.” See Fry v. Pliler, 551
U.S. 112, 121 (2007) (“[A] court must assess the prejudicial impact of
constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and
injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht . . . .”); see also Findley & Scott,
supra note 29, at 353 (“As grim as the prospects look for obtaining relief based
on an innocence-based claim on direct appeal, the prospects are even grimmer
thereafter.”).
168. For the relevant cases, see generally Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.
461 (1997), McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927),
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), Walter v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984), and Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), respectively.
169. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 291 (1991).
170. Id. at 282.
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evidence presented in order to determine whether . . . admission
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 171 Thus, harmless
error analysis ends up functioning in a similar fashion when
applied to both evidentiary and constitutional errors. 172
B. Photoshopped Trials
The structure of the analysis weighs in favor of affirming
convictions, but to differing extents depending on which of two
inconsistent approaches a particular court applies. 173 In the
jurisprudence of harmless error, courts have proceeded through
either an “evidence-focused” or an “outcome-focused” inquiry. 174
In the former, an error is harmful if it contributed to the verdict,
and the persuasive force of other evidence does not control. 175 In
the latter approach, so long as there was sufficient evidence that
was properly admitted to sustain the verdict, any error is deemed
harmless. 176
Although the “evidence-focused” inquiry appears more
consistent with review of the actual trial, in practice, wherever
courts perceive overwhelming evidence, they tend to view the
error as insignificant and thus affirm. 177 What courts say they are
doing when considering an error and the analysis that they
perform often diverge. That is, despite the content of the
Chapman standard for reviewing constitutional errors, the Brecht
171. Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
172. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986) (“[T]he Court in
Chapman recognized that some constitutional errors require reversal without
regard to the evidence in the particular case.”).
173. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1336 (stating that harmless error
doctrine “has been plagued by . . . ambiguities since its inception,” including
“uncertainty about how harmless error should be judged”).
174. Id. at 1341.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1341–42 (proper application of the contribution-to-conviction
test would deem an error “harmful unless it was relatively trivial” while the
“overwhelming-evidence test would deem an error harmful only when the
overall case against the defendant was relatively weak”); cf. Weiler v. United
States, 323 U.S. 606, 611 (1945) (stating that the Court was not authorized to
“reach the conclusion that the error was harmless because we think the
defendant was guilty”).
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standard on federal habeas, and related iterations, 178 courts
generally do not focus on the prejudicial “contributions” the error
might have made but only on the general question whether “the
record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 179 As a result, in upwards of two-thirds of all habeas cases
in which a court identifies trial error, that error is deemed
harmless. 180
The reason the precise words of the standards do not matter
very much is that no formulation can enable courts to see the
outcome of an error-free trial that did not occur. 181 It is hard to
identify meaningful distinctions between what are functionally
just iterations of the same test. 182 And that test proceeds from the
false premise that errors can be excised or airbrushed to enable
review.
Applied narrative theory foretells the failure of these
standards because it suggests that quantitative assertions are
impossible to make. If a defense lawyer consistently fails to join
issue with the government in an adversarial process, or a jury
hears a defendant’s coerced but compelling confession, how does
one measure that impact? Given the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard that the government must meet, even very small errors
have the potential to alter the outcome. Trials may involve
178. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993).
179. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986); see also United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510–11 (1983) (“The question a reviewing court must ask
is this: absent the prosecutor’s allusion to the failure of the defense to
proffer evidence to rebut the testimony of the victims, is it clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?”).
180. Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can
Help Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053,
1066–67 (2005). But cf. D. Brian Wallace & Saul M. Kassin, Harmless Error
Analysis: How Do Judges Respond to Confession Errors, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
151, 152 (1998) (finding, in a simulation, that over 90% of judges would find
admission of a coerced confession harmful).
181. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that the difficulty of applying differing harm standards
is especially acute “because they are applied to the hypothesizing of events that
never in fact occurred,” which is an enterprise “closer to divination” than
“factfinding”).
182. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the “ineffable gradations of
probability” in the various harm standards “quite beyond the ability of the
judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp, and thus harmful rather than helpful to
the consistency and rationality of judicial decisionmaking”).
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multiple missteps with cumulative impact. Death penalty cases,
for example, have two distinct phases that require review, and
the longer and more serious trials that death penalty cases
involve are both more complex to assess and concern more serious
and horrible crimes that already inspire confirmation bias.
Nonetheless, when courts review error, it is as though they have
“photoshopped” the trial and considered whether the new image
supports a conviction. 183
To mitigate hindsight bias requires articulating the standard
in more holistic terms and considering new mechanisms for its
application. And that may call for a more qualitative than
quantitative approach. As Justice Stevens wrote in his United
States v. Hasting184 concurrence, the question is “what effect the
error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s
decision” and “[t]he crucial thing is the impact of the thing done
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one’s own, in the total
setting.” 185 Indeed, there may be constitutional implications to
the construction of the harmless error standard. The defendant
has a right to present evidence to the jury empaneled to hear her
case; invoking the “sympathy and opinion” of those jurors is an
opportunity guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 186
The standard originally did task courts with “pondering all
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the
whole,” 187 but the most recent cases not only shift the burden but
also change the question. In practice, when appeals courts look at
the issue of evidence strength instead of error impact, they sit as
183. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1354 (“[A]n assumption that appellate
judges can conduct a fair second trial on the basis of ‘untainted evidence’ is
problematic in that it assumes that fine distinctions can be drawn between
tainted and untainted evidence when all of this evidence remains in the record
as a coherent whole.”). Indeed, the difficulty of excising evidence admitted in
error has raised the question whether testimony could all be videotaped before a
jury is empaneled. Once all errors and irrelevancies are removed according to a
trial judge’s rulings, the jury would then watch it. See generally Ronald
Goldstock & James B. Jacobs, A Blockbuster Trial, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 565 (1998).
184. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
185. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 763–64 (1946)).
186. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1355 (“Indeed, the defendant may seek
to exploit the sympathies of jurors who have not become immune to the pleas of
defendants or jaded by repeated encounters with hardened criminals.”).
187. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
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fact-finders in the first instance. The result is that defendants
receive a verdict not from “peers” but from “experienced jurists”
who may have “become immune to the pleas of defendants.” 188
Regardless of the type of error under review, the determination
as to harm depends primarily on a “judgment about the factual
guilt of the defendant.” 189 And the trend has been to continue
raising the bar for reversal by “reducing the number of errors
that are reversible per se” and “reducing the burden of proof on
the prosecution of convincing the appellate court that an error
was harmless.” 190
The Supreme Court was recently poised to consider this
conflict between determining guilt and weighing error in Vasquez
v. United States. 191 Vasquez involved a conviction for conspiracy
to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it. 192 The
government presented evidence of recorded telephone calls in
which a witness told her husband that he and Vasquez were
likely to be convicted, and that the defendant’s lawyer had said so
as well. 193 The Seventh Circuit held, in light of the other evidence
in the case, that the error did not change the outcome of the
proceeding. 194 Arguing to the Supreme Court, the defendant
claimed that a reviewing court should determine how an error
affected the jury that actually evaluated the trial. 195 The
188. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1355. In House v. Bell, for example, Chief
Justice Roberts explained that, even with regard to an actual innocence claim,
the question is “not whether [the defendant] was prejudiced at his trial because
the jurors were not aware of the new evidence” but whether “all the evidence,
considered together, proves that [the defendant] was actually innocent, so that
no reasonable juror would vote to convict him.” 547 U.S. 518, 556 (2006)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
189. Edwards, supra note 10, at 1171; see also ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE
OF HARMLESS ERROR 35 (1970) (“A less stringent test may fail to deter an
appellate judge from focusing his inquiry on the correctness of the result and
then holding an error harmless whenever he equated the result with his own
predilections.”).
190. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 3 J. LEG.
STUD. 161, 172 (2001).
191. 132 S. Ct. 1532 (2012).
192. United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2011).
193. Id. at 896.
194. Id. at 898.
195. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Vasquez v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 1532 (2012) (No. 11-199) (statement of Beau B. Brindley) (“It is
impermissible for the reviewing court to merely ask the question of whether
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government countered that the Court could assume instead that
a hypothetical, reasonable jury heard the evidence. 196 The
Justices repeatedly stated at argument, however, that they did
not see the distinction between the two standards. 197 The case
turned out to be a poor vehicle because it was not clear which
standard the Seventh Circuit itself applied, or whether the
standard applied would have made much difference. As a result,
the Court ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari as
“improvidently granted.” 198 It serves as an illustration, however,
of the way in which hindsight standards continue to ease the
government’s burden of proof. 199
Courts both discount the effect of the challenged error and
weigh the evidence as a whole, and they then fail to engage in the
required counterfactual reasoning. Especially once judges are
themselves exposed to erroneously admitted evidence, it is
profoundly difficult to assess what a hypothetical juror without
that evidence would have concluded. 200 If evidence is
some other jury, a reasonable jury that didn’t hear the error that this jury
heard, would convict him and determine harmlessness on that basis.”).
196. See id. at 28 (statement of Anthony A. Yang) (“The harmless-error
inquiry, as this Court explained in Neder and prior decisions, turns ultimately
on one question: Whether a rational jury—and this is a quote—‘whether a
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’”).
197. See id. at 8 (statement of Justice Alito) (stating that “I really don’t
understand the difference between” focusing on a “rational jury” and focusing on
“this particular jury”); id. at 9 (statement of Justice Alito) (inquiring about the
difference between “a fair possibility that this particular evidence caused the
jury to convict” and a “fair possibility that this jury would have convicted
without the evidence”); id. at 16 (statement of Justice Breyer) (“I didn’t see some
big war of standards. I just saw judges disagreeing about a fairly tough question
in an individual case.”); id. at 27 (statement of Justice Alito) (“How is an
appellate court supposed to tell whether this particular jury was different from
a hypothetical rational jury?”).
198. Vasquez, 132 S. Ct. at 1532.
199. See Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 992 (“If the ‘moral force’ of the
criminal law is not to be diluted on appeal, convictions must be reversed where
the appellate court cannot arrive at a conclusion about the impact of an error on
the jury verdict with the same degree of certainty demanded at the trial.”); see
also TRAYNOR, supra note 189, at 61 (“[T]he prosecution cannot on the one hand
offer evidence to prove guilt . . . and on the other for the purposes of avoiding the
consequences of the error, caused by its wrongful admission, be heard to assert
that the matter offered as a confession was not prejudicial because it did not
tend to prove guilt.”).
200. See Wallace & Kassin, supra note 180, at 152 (concluding from an
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interdependent, moreover, then demonstrating that any given
piece did not “contribute” to the outcome ought to be a heavy
burden. 201 There are no “scripts for conviction,” and no clear way
to determine whether an error meaningfully changed the
narrative. Or at least one can rarely say “beyond a reasonable
doubt” that an error did not make any contribution. As with
Brady and Strickland violations, courts have overestimated the
precision with which they can weigh the significance of an error
or omission within the complete picture of the trial. 202 Indeed,
they cannot actually do what harmless error review demands, 203
and a standard less encumbered by hindsight could produce both
clearer and more accurate decisions.
VI. Limiting the Role of Hindsight
Just as these three different contexts reveal common
conceptual flaws, they might be reimagined in similar ways.
Translating theoretical and empirical insights into adjustments
to legal rules is a notoriously glacial process. 204 To attempt it at
experimental analysis that judges exposed to prejudicial evidence admitted in
error would view guilt as more likely than judges unaware of the evidence); see
generally Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and
Mental Correction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1984).
201. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–23 (1967) (“The question is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction.”).
202. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence
Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 190 (2006) (“[P]rofessionals typically overestimate
the power of their own professional skills, the reliability of their own judgments,
and the strength of their ability to assess a particular situation.”); Suzanna
Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 799 (2003) (reviewing
the literature on the fallibility of judges); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in
Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. R. 65, 1–3 (1983) (reporting that even
graduate students in probability theory believe a conjunction is more likely than
either of its constituent parts). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
136 (1968) (“We, of course, acknowledge the impossibility of determining
whether in fact the jury did or did not ignore [the] statement inculpating
petitioner in determining petitioner’s guilt.”).
203. See Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV.
501, 516 (1998) (“[A] judge cannot possibly know or review what in the minds of
the jurors led to the verdict.”).
204. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J.
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all raises the question whether judges can account for social
science in their own decision-making. Only recently, for example,
has awareness about eyewitness error and false confessions made
any incursion into the adjudicative realm. 205 But courts have
begun to perceive the shortcomings of hindsight standards, and
they might conduct a more searching review of the role of the
error or omission at the actual trial, expand the violations that
give rise to a presumption of prejudice, or remove materiality
assessments from the calculus altogether.
A. Verdicts Untainted by Error
Any effort to invigorate review will encounter not only the
cognitive biases that confirm convictions but also conscious policy
choices to avoid the inefficiency of retrials. The harmless error
rule, for example, has long been understood as a protection for
both the sustainability and the legitimacy of criminal
adjudication. 206 Significant adjustments to harmless error rules
would raise administrability concerns, 207 and there is “no reason
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 63 (2011) (discussing the durability of myths about
cross-examination and the courts’ disinclination to “incorporate empirical data
and the insights of social science”); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus
Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155 (“What is
remarkable, however, is the ever-widening gap between Fourth Amendment
consent jurisprudence, on the one hand, and scientific findings about the
psychology of compliance and consent on the other.”).
205. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, A Plan to Combat Mistaken Identifications and
False Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2015, at A21 (“[A] rare coalition of the
New York State Bar Association, the District Attorneys Association of New York
and the Innocence Project proposed on Tuesday that the state adopt practices to
reduce the chances that juries would be swayed by mistaken eyewitnesses or
false confessions.”).
206. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (acknowledging
that the goal of harmless error review is “to conserve judicial resources by
enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error
without becoming mired in harmless error”); see generally, e.g., Note, The
Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 450 (1947).
207. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1994) (noting
that the systematic costs of overturning jury verdicts are high); Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 447 (2009)
(describing the harmless error rule as arising from concerns about efficiency and
the finality of convictions).
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to believe that appellate courts are much interested in increasing
the number of correct-outcome cases that they will scrutinize
closely.” 208
Efficiency ought to be only a secondary consideration, 209 but
it is an imperative that requires some safety valve. One seems
built-in however. The question is not whether a verdict was
untouched by error but whether it stands untainted by it. Even
the strictest of harmless error tests “would not require reversal
for insignificant errors” or lead to “hypertechnicality.” 210 There
are trials in which it is apparent that no further disclosure,
improved advocacy, or more precise application of the
exclusionary rules could possibly change the outcome. For
example, a witness with respect to whom impeachment material
was withheld might be one of many possible sponsors for a
business record, or an attorney might neglect the testing of
flawed forensics that duplicate several other pieces of evidence. 211
Mitigating hindsight does not entail reversing for every trivial
error.
The current process also insulates non-trivial errors from
review, however, and reversal should occur unless the
government can demonstrate that errors and violations were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 212 That showing requires
not that the evidence of guilt was sufficiently overwhelming to
208. Schauer, supra note 202, at 200.
209. See Brown, supra note 50, at 142 (“American courts, which have played
the lead role in making criminal process more efficient, could improve American
political decision-making by developing the law and practice of adjudication
with less priority for its efficiency and more for its traditional, qualitative public
interests.”); Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1366 (“One goal of the harmless error
doctrine is the preservation of public respect for the judicial system by not
reversing for nonprejudicial errors[, but] public respect may also be undermined
when significant errors go uncorrected, and when constitutional rights thus go
unprotected.”); see also TRAYNOR, supra note 189, at 19 (“The conservation of
judicial resources, though itself a worthy objective, is a strange terminal point
for an argument purportedly concerned with precluding miscarriages of
justice.”).
210. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1367.
211. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“Attorney errors come in an infinite
variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless.”).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 2007)
(stating that the reviewing court must be “convinced that the jury would have
convicted even absent the error”).
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ignore the error altogether, but that in context, it is apparent
that the jury reached a verdict untainted by the error. 213
Adjustments to the standard that excise materiality are unlikely,
but much would change if courts applied the existing standard to
the trial that occurred rather than “reviewing” an error-free trial
that never took place and looking to the end of a road not taken.
That road simply cannot be seen clearly. Errors can
contribute to verdicts by changing the shape of other pieces of
evidence or the mind of one juror. To take just one example from
“coherence based reasoning,” as Dan Kahan explains, “evidence
judged to have been of only modest weight early on will
subsequently be re-evaluated and assigned a greater degree of
weight consistent with the outcome most supported by the
remaining evidence.” 214 The question is whether it is reasonable
to conclude that an error had any effect on the course a trial took,
not whether it is reasonable to conclude that a conviction would
have occurred regardless. Another way to think about this
involves an attempt to evaluate how the error or omission in
question affected the presentation and processing of evidence. If
the working hypothesis is that an error was harmless, then the
best way to establish that is by attempting to disprove it through
consideration of scenarios under which the error would have been
harmful. 215
To account for the seriousness of an error and its likely role
in the narrative course of trial, courts could also focus on the
extent to which the evidence does intertwine. It is entirely
possible for a case to have more than sufficient evidence to
support a conviction but for an error nonetheless to contribute to
the verdict. Those two facts can coexist because, even though the
other evidence is weighty, it is not entirely independent from the
error. 216 An adjusted analysis could account for factors such as
213.
214.

Id.
Dan M. Kahan, Laws of Cognition and the Cognition of Law, 135
COGNITION 56 (2015).
215. See FINDLEY & O’BRIEN, supra note 69, at 37 (explaining that, “without
testing for outcomes that would disprove a hypothesis, people may never
consider that their hypotheses were wrong and that they had merely proposed
conditions that coincidentally fit the actual rule or principle at work” but that,
“[a]s any scientist knows, the inability to disprove a hypothesis is the closest one
can come to proving the hypothesis to be true”).
216. See Griffin, supra note 17, at 295 (discussing the way in which pieces of
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whether evidence admitted or excluded in error is largely
collateral or interacts with central elements of proof, whether
witnesses with regard to whom impeachment material was
withheld provided key testimony for the government, or whether
counsel’s deficient performance forfeited an opportunity to rebut
damaging evidence.
On the other hand, when an error only compounds
substantial disadvantages for the defense, it may be held
harmless. The error may not be fully independent from the rest of
the trial, but its effect will have been minimal. Considering the
nature of an error does account for the weight of other evidence
as well. But that is not to say that a strong government case
excuses an otherwise egregious error, just that whether a case is
closely balanced should factor into the assessment of the error
itself. For example, one signal that the jury viewed a case as close
could be a split verdict. Moreover, the record can reveal how
much emphasis prosecutors placed on the error in questioning
and argument, how much they profited from it or leveraged the
opportunity, 217 the connection between the error and the defense
theory of the case, and in some cases whether the jury asked
questions that an evidentiary error might have affected, engaged
in lengthy deliberations, or even reacted to erroneously admitted
evidence with emotion or confusion. 218
The dissenting judge in Vasquez, for instance, characterized
the gravity of the error itself, which discredited “the defendant’s
own lawyer’s argument about reasonable doubt.” 219 The dissent
then concluded that the error was harmful given the split verdict,
the government’s use of the evidence, and “the modest strength of
evidence interact with and influence each other).
217. See United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding harmful error because the prosecutor made an assertion in closing
argument that the prosecutor “knew was contradicted by evidence not presented
to the jury”).
218. Similarly, jury questions have been held by some courts to signal the
potential import of undisclosed evidence. See United States v. Garner, 507 F.3d
399, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that a reasonable probability existed that
the outcome of the trial might have been different had defense counsel
investigated cell phone records based in part on “the fact that the jury sent out a
question during deliberations” asking about a cell phone number).
219. United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton,
J., dissenting).
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the rest of the [G]overnment’s case.” 220 When it comes to
analyzing an erroneous exclusion—such as discovery that a
defendant did not receive, or an opportunity that a defense
lawyer missed—the reviewing court (typically a habeas court)
could consider what the fact-finder might have gained had the
avenue not been cut off. 221
This analytical approach is not unprecedented. Where a
Confrontation Clause violation denies a defendant the
opportunity to impeach a government witness for bias, the
Supreme Court has at times engaged in a contextual
consideration of the “damaging potential of cross-examination.” 222
The Court has then weighed that potential gain against the
importance of the prosecution witness’s testimony, accounting for
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of corroborating or contradictory evidence on material points, and
the overall strength of the case. 223 Without question, such an
inquiry still involves speculation, but it at least considers not
only “what might have been” but also “what was.” The current
standard arguably requires that approach already, and the
missteps have been in application. 224
An analogous theoretical move attempts to align
decision-making with the purposes of standards of proof like
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” 225 When assessing whether
discovery was material, counsel’s performance prejudicial, or an
error harmful, judges might also benefit from what Michael
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 990 (noting that, because of a
particular error, “[a] meritorious line of defense may be dropped, an important
witness held back, or entire strategies abandoned even though they should
prevail”).
222. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
223. Id.
224. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (calling the panel’s ruling “dangerously broad” with “far-reaching
implications for the administration of justice” because it “effectively announces
that the prosecution need not produce exculpatory evidence so long as it’s
possible the defendant would’ve been convicted anyway”).
225. Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1099
(2009) (discussing application of the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard
and stating that “courts lack a vocabulary through which to make their
reasoning explicit and to justify their doubts and convictions about what a
reasonable jury could or must conclude based on the evidence”).
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Pardo has called “second-order proof rules.” 226 To determine
whether there is a connection between error and outcome, courts
could ask whether there are plausible explanations consistent
with innocence that the error prevented the jury from
considering. In Pardo’s terms, this revised question gives courts a
“vocabulary” with which to make reasoning about outcomes
explicit. 227 He suggests using “explanatory inferences” to “avoid
the problem of pure subjectivity that affects confidence-based
probability assessments.” 228 Thus, one useful inquiry might be
whether a story of the jury’s consideration of the case affected by
the error makes more sense than one that does not. Reframing
the inquiry along these lines would resolve, for example, the
inconsistency between considering whether there is otherwise
overwhelming evidence and whether an error contributed to the
verdict in the harmless error calculus. 229
Put another way, correct application of the test for prejudice
requires a reviewing court to “consider the opposite.” To borrow a
term from management decision theory, one might view the
possibility of different trial outcomes as “knowable unknowns”
rather than “unknown unknowns.” 230 When making a prospective
decision, one can “imagine” a “known unknown” and should
regard it as having a real possibility of occurring. 231
Merely recognizing that hindsight is clouded 232 and “trying
hard” to see around it does little to improve processing. 233
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1103.
229. See Vasquez v. United States, 635 F.3d 889, 899 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (describing this inconsistency).
230. Alberto Feduzi & Jochen Runde, Uncovering Unknown Unknowns:
Toward a Baconian Approach to Management Decision-Making, 124 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 268, 270 (2014). As Feduzi and Runde
explain, in the case of a die toss, the known unknowns are the elementary
events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Id. The “unknown unknowns”—which are termed
“Black Swans” when they go on to occur—would be ones “that the decisionmaker does not imagine and therefore does not even consider.” Id. An example
here would be a seven-sided die and the event of rolling a 7. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 586–88 (“No matter how a judgment
made in hindsight is restructured, the feeling that an outcome was both
inevitable and predictable is impossible to avoid.”).
233. See Baruch Fischoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J.
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Decision-makers are oriented towards “unfoldings of the world
described in sufficient detail to determine the relevant
consequences of each of the possible courses of action.” 234 But
actively constructing a trial in which the error or the failure to
disclose or perform did affect the verdict might mitigate some
hindsight failures and further ensure correct placement of the
burden of proof. 235 The Supreme Court offered a useful potential
structure for such decision-making in its most recent Brady
decision. 236 In Smith v. Cain, 237 the Court concluded that the
government cannot meets its burden of showing that a violation
is immaterial if it only “offers a reason that the jury could have
disbelieved [the undisclosed evidence], but gives us no confidence
that it would have done so.” 238 If courts were to review errors in
context and, when uncertain, proceed as though they affected the
verdict, 239 integrated decision-making—that counts a different
outcome as a real possibility—could emerge.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 356 (1977)
(“Even when told to do so, it is evidently extremely difficult to de-process so
important a bit of information as the right answer, inadmissible evidence, or an
act of aggression followed by mitigating circumstances.”); see also John C.
Anderson, et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the
Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 730 (1993) (“Individuals tend to give
higher relevance to negative factors (cues) when the outcome was negative and
to give higher relevance to positive factors (cues) when the outcome was
positive.”).
234. Feduzi & Runde, supra note 230, at 270.
235. See Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the
Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING
268 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (explaining that, although
hindsight bias is “resistant to debiasing,” approaches involving considering
alternatives have been effective because “if the occurring event cued its own
causal chains, then considering the non-occurring event ought to accomplish the
analogous result, thereby decreasing the bias”); see also Charles G. Lord et al.,
Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) (finding that “the cognitive
strategy of considering opposite possibilities promote[s] impartiality”). See
generally Michelle R. Nario & Nyla R. Branscombe, Comparison Processes in
Hindsight and Causal Attribution, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1244
(1995); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000).
236. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 434 (1995) (“We conclude that
the uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it
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B. Standards for Systemic Failures

Finally, courts should pay particular attention to errors that
relate to breaches of duty and symptoms of systemic failure. 240
Here, a quantitative approach, not in the probabilistic sense, but
to draw bright lines, could supplement the holistic inquiry into
error. For instance, certain objective markers of the adequacy of
counsel—such as interviewing eyewitnesses and investigating
exculpatory evidence—might help courts look past hindsight,
despite the Strickland Court’s resistance to listing any
“mechanical rules.” 241
The distinction between structural and non-structural errors
already recognizes that some flaws in the trial compromise fair
adjudication to such an extent that no amount of certainty about
outcome justifies affirmance. Types of error that pervade the trial
but fall outside these categories also warrant closer scrutiny.
Prejudice is presumed, for example, when the court commands
joint representation over a defendant’s objection. 242 The
reasoning goes that an inquiry into a claim of harmless error
would “require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation” and
thus is not “susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application.” 243
Yet hindsight about the impact of ineffective assistance of counsel
requires the same unguided speculation. As with counsel
constrained by joint representation, incompetent counsel might
refrain from doing things, and the effect of that restraint on
“options, tactics, and decisions” will not be apparent from the
record. 244
Recent developments also suggest a potential hybrid category
of semi-structural errors, with respect to which prejudice could be
affected the verdict (i.e., as if it had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict’).”); see also Edwards, supra note 10,
at 1194 (concluding that “serious doubt” about whether a trial without the error
would have produced a different result requires reversal).
240. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1366 (“The overwhelming-evidence
test ignores the argument that, even if conviction appears inevitable, there is a
point at which an error becomes too great to condone as a matter of
constitutional integrity and prosecutorial deterrence.”).
241. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
242. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978).
243. Id. at 491.
244. Id. at 490–91.
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presumed, though reversal would not be automatic. One reading
of the Lafler and Frye extensions of the right to counsel is that
clear violations of ex ante professional norms weigh more heavily
than other errors. Some cases of ineffective assistance of counsel
arise from strategic decisions or from generally inartful advocacy.
But cases in which the deficient performance involves breaches of
duty like the failure to communicate a plea offer, or neglecting to
conduct pretrial mitigation investigation in a capital case, require
an especially rigorous approach, one that expressly clears away
hindsight blindness to improve accuracy.
A similar argument applies to breaches of a prosecutor’s duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence. As Judge Kozinski wrote in
Olsen, prosecutors don’t fulfill Brady obligations because “courts
don’t make them care.” 245 If hindsight no longer shielded
prosecutors from the consequences of withholding discovery, or
defense lawyers from accountability for errors, they might care a
great deal more about those requirements. 246
Even guided speculation done as thoughtfully as possible,
however, is currently out of the reach of most habeas courts, who
face claims that are often procedurally defaulted. 247 State
post-conviction review limits “the range of issues that can be
raised on collateral attack” and also imposes “heightened burdens
on defendants” because “finality interests are given greater
prominence over concerns about wrongful convictions.” 248 It is
245. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 626 (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad
in the land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588–
89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“An automatic application of the harmless
error review in case after case, and for error after error, can only encourage
prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the
ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a
particular case.”).
246. See Baer, supra note 75, at 5 (“[M]ost prosecutors and their offices
remain fairly insulated from the prospect of liability.”).
247. The layers that separate a habeas petitioner from error review were
recently restated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Ayala, in which the majority
concluded that post-conviction relief is available only where both the trial
court’s error and the appellate court’s decision that the error was harmless are
so deeply inconsistent with established precedent that no fair-minded jurist
could agree. See 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (concerning the exclusion of
defense counsel from Batson proceedings).
248. Findley & Scott, supra note 29, at 353.
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harder still at the federal level, which involves “strict time limits
and numerous procedural and substantive barriers” arising from
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 249
Moreover, there is a circumstantial blind spot: Concealed
evidence tends to stay that way, and ineffective assistance of
counsel also requires some subsequent lawyer to uncover the
evidence or strategy that prior counsel neglected. 250
The acuteness of the hindsight blindness problem stems as
well from the interaction between these three categories of error.
The discovery process fails to level the informational playing
field, subpar counsel cannot correct for that disadvantage in the
adversarial process, and reviewing courts are reluctant to retry
cases of claimed error. One could view all of these structural
impediments as a reason not to revisit hindsight standards. But
perhaps they suggest instead that the danger of overvaluing
errors and raising the reversal rate is not that high. Especially in
the rare cases where defendants have access to post-conviction
fact development and successfully uncover systemic failures like
Brady violations and inadequate representation, a more rigorous
review is warranted, through a clearer lens than the current
hindsight standard.
VII. Conclusion
The undeniable existence of error in criminal adjudication—
which is often connected to cognitive failings—calls for
reconsideration of the mechanisms available to reviewing courts
for error correction. The inability to clearly see how discovery
violations, deficient counsel, or evidentiary flaws affected a trial
determination precludes close scrutiny of systemic failings.
Actual change to the underlying standards themselves seems
unlikely. Brady, Strickland, and Brecht are all fairly entrenched
precedents. It is a useful step, however, to illuminate the problem
of cognitive bias in applying those standards. More rigorous and
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 5, at 111 n.206 (“[S]uppression of
exculpatory evidence is difficult to uncover. Absent discovery of the police and
prosecution files, even after exoneration potential Brady violations may not
come to light.”).

HINDSIGHT BLIND SPOTS

215

better-informed application could restore the role of reviewing
courts as the safety valve in a process that has failed to correct
itself. Precious few trials take place, and the ones that do occur
also perform an important audit function for the criminal justice
process. Trials expose investigative and prosecutorial tactics to
both judicial and public review. Appellate reversals of convictions
also send important messages about fair procedures. But if
prosecutorial ethics, attorney performance, and evidentiary error
remain behind a hindsight barrier and thus lie beyond the reach
of reviewing courts, little will change despite empirical evidence
of wrongful convictions and the most recent social science on
accurate fact-finding.

